Abstract. This article proposes a model of a system of destabilizing effects on the software of an automated system that describes the strategy and tactics of the actions of certain types of violations with the aim of realizing threats to information security through malicious software. Based on the theory of system analysis and the theory of complex systems modeling, an approach is proposed to describe the processes of destabilizing effects that allow to take into account the structure of software, to monitor its interface and to exert malicious software effects on it by limiting its availability and integrity while the software components of the software of automated systems. The materials of the article provide a formalized description of the structure of the software, its interface, malicious software actions that lead to destabilization and the emergence of information conflicts in the operation of automated systems. The presented model and its software implementation will make it possible to comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of information protection systems for automated control systems for critical objects.
Introduction
The successful solution of the problem of ensuring the information security of automated control systems (ACS) by critical objects (CO) is based on ensuring the protection of information, primarily processes related to information processing, as they are the object of most security threats to many information systems [1] [2] [3] . At the same time, the confidential nature of the information circulating in such systems, and the increasing demands for their protection, reinforce this trend [4, 5] .
The development of measures to protect information adequate to the threats of processed information in the ACS of the CO led to the development of appropriate mathematical models for the design and creation of tools and systems for protecting information from unauthorized access (SPIFUA) [6, 7] .
This article proposes a model of the system of destabilizing influences (SDI) on the software of the ACS, which describes the strategy and tactics of the actions of certain types of violations with the aim of realizing threats to information security through malicious software actions (MSA).
The actions of the violator, depending on its potential in the implementation of threats to information security, provide for the identification and use of vulnerabilities in microprogram, systemwide and application software, network equipment used in the automated control system, as well as in the organization of information protection and ACS CO. In determining how to implement threats to information security, it is necessary to take into account the fact that threats to information security can be realized directly through access to ACS CO software and / or information or indirectly through the creation of conditions and (or) means that provide such access, and also due to access or impact on the servicing infrastructure. In this case, the local goal of the violator who does not have access (access rights) to the ACS software and / or information is usually to gain access to the software (including through external public communication networks) and to obtain the maximum possible rights and privileges in such access.
Violators can commit actions that result in a violation of information security, deliberately (deliberate thunderstorms of information security) or accidentally (unintended thunderstorms of information security).
Intentional actions of violators can consist in the implementation of targeted or non-targeted threats to information security, which depend on the structural and functional characteristics and features of the ACS CO software.
The formulation of the problem
Let's consider the conditional project on creation of some ACS of the CO. We will proceed from the fact that the projected software ACS is a set of software components (SC), both developed by the project executors independently, and purchased from third-party manufacturers. Each of the SC is specified by a set of external system characteristics, namely: the functions to be performed, control commands, information and resource requirements [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
The task is to develop such an SDI model that could describe the implementation of the partial threats to information security for the subsequent security assessment of the ACS CO software and the effectiveness of the applied ISS.
Functional typology and formalized description of the structure of the ACS software
The SC(software components) is a modular "unit" of the ACS software, which is replaced within the operating environment of the ACS CO software. Its internal components are hidden, but access to SC functions can be obtained by using one or several well-defined provided interfaces. The SC can also have the required interfaces required for stable (highly reliable) operation. The required interface determines which functions and services it requires from other SC to operate the ISS, which in turn control and control the operation of the SC ACS. By combining the provided and required interfaces of several PC, you can create a larger PC, integrated into the application software of the automated control system, which has the specified functionality. It can be said that all applied software of ACS, in fact, is a SC of a higher level.
The task will be to develop such a typology of mutual influence of the SC that are part of the ACS of the CO, which can serve as a basis for solving the problem of stable (highly reliable) functioning of these systems in the environment of external and internal IS threats while ensuring the required quality level of the ACS CO software. As the basis for the description of the system of functioning of the software for automated control systems, let's take the work of Makarenko S.I, in which the approach to the development of a multilevel dynamic model of information conflict of the communication model is proposed, by analogy with his work [13] .
In order to solve the problem, we introduce the following notation: N -total number of SC (software components), which are part of the ACS CO software, including ISS(the means and systems of information protection) and SDI (system destructive impacts); (ext) Thr -external threats IS (the external security threats) or malware (the malicious software viruses) -deliberate exposures, representing some of the available functions of the SC or embedded in the software by attackers, implemented by SDI; (int) Thr -internal threats IS (the internal security threats)which are internal system conflicts between SC that have arisen unintentionally due to the fault of the designer or during the operation of the SC, as well as due to the impact of external IS threats, also implemented by the subsystems of SDI; 
-a set of SC interfaces used at the l -th level of the functioning of the software;
-a number of SC interfaces used at the l -th level of the functioning of software that is exposed to an external threat
Thr on a variety of parameters of the operating environment software (the operating environment software) ( 
Isc Thr E -a set of SC interfaces used at l the level of functioning of the software that is exposed to the internal threat
Thr on a variety of parameters of the software operation environment (fun) 
4.Model of SDI on the ACS software
For the sake of convenience, visual perception is depicted in Fig. 1 structure of software ACS CO, taking into account controlled SDI parameters. 
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the monitoring channel for the output parameters of the software ASU ISS-1 control system (subsystems for controlling destabilizing and harmful effects): 
while equality
is ensured only in cases where the SDI-1 malefactor has full access to the ISS-1 surveillance channel (for example, by interception of the surveillance channel messages
). Ch1 . As a rule, this problem is solved on the basis of the theory of system analysis with subsequent identification and classification [14] [15] [16] . At the second stage, the task of determining 
and the narrowing of the reaction associated with the discreteness constraints 
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of SDI-1 in the decision making subsystem, based on the available algorithms of the attacker, depending on the method and method of harmful impact, SDI-1 decides on the strategy and tactics for the implementation of harmful effects T form a plan of harmful effects. The plan of harmful effects can be realized:
-in discrete time 
The probability of identification of the malware thre a tis determined, where
The fact that the 1, 2, iI   particular problems of information protection solved by the typedependent ISS-1 are dependent, as an indicator of effectiveness (the effectiveness of information security), use the expression: РР  ; as a private indicator of the effectiveness of counteracting ISS-2 malware threats of an embedded type, it is reasonable to use the probability of meeting the condition:
ie.
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The effective eess of countering threats to malware on the SCACS by means of information protection both attached and embedded type is expedient to determine us in generalized indicator of the form:
Analysis of experimental results
Based on the results of the simulation, we will analyze the functioning of the automated control system in order to determine the best strategy to counter threats to information security to the SC ACS CO. Statistical sampling of the results of the assessment of the effectiveness of identification of the malware threat on the ACS of the CO with data protection means of various types is presented in Table 1 . In the course of the experiment, it was established that the complex use of different types of ISS makes it possible to increase the information protection efficiency from 60% to 75% in comparison with the use of only the ISS type of the type to be delivered and to increase the protection efficiency from 15% to 30% in comparison with the use of only the ISS of the embedded type. As a result of the implementation of the simulation model, a fact was established that confirms that the lack of the use of the ISS reduces the timeliness of the implementation of information processing tasks in the ACS from 60% to 80%. The use of the ISS type of the type being assigned increases the timeliness of information processing in the ACS from 25% to 50%. The use of a ISS embedded type improves the timeliness of the implementation of information processing tasks in the ACS from 45% to 60%. The complex use of different types of ISS within the framework of the method proposed in the dissertation [6] increases the timeliness of the implementation of information processing tasks in the ACS from 35% to 65%. The graphic interpretation of the calculation sis shown in figure 3 . 
Conclusion
Thus, the presented model of SDI can be described as a dynamic system functioning in a complex parametric environment, while the interface of the SC itself is actually part of two control loops -ISS-1 control and monitoring of the qualitative and safe functioning of the SC, responsible for ensuring the required level of security in the context of the impact on the ACS of external and internal threats of IS and SDI-1 of an impact management system with antagonistic performance objectives.The model can be used as a test model for modeling security threats in assessing the effectiveness of the subsystem for monitoring and detecting MSA of a structurally-dependent IS of an embedded type that ensures the integrity control of software ACS CO in conflict with hackers, insiders, phreakers, crackers and other computer crime subjects [19] . TheproposedmathematicalmodelofSDIcanbeusedtodevelopnewstrategiesformanagingtheoperationo fACS COsoftwareinthecontextofthecompleximpactofmalicioussoftwaretoolsforcomputerreconnaissance.
